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Introduction 
 
Many types of texts are the subject of translation, and one such type is the translation of 
legal texts. While legal translation itself is of course not a new phenomenon, the 
discussion of legal translation within translation studies seems to be a fairly recent 
development, with much of the research on legal translation coming from the field of 
comparative law, rather than translation studies. General translation studies theories 
often fail to address issues in legal translation, perhaps due to its highly specialized 
nature. Nevertheless, legal translation plays a vital role in communication in both 
national and international law, which is especially important in today's world. 
 When it comes to the translation of legal texts, the general strategy that 
translators tend to employ is to produce a foreignizing or source culture-oriented 
translation (e.g. Rayar 1997, xvii). This is done to prevent the reader from obtaining a 
false sense of security and thinking that the foreign legal system is the same as their 
legal system. One scholar of general translation theory who discussed the effects of 
foreignization and domestication on translations is Antoine Berman. Berman (2012) 
outlined a system of textual deformations, initially aimed at the translation of literary 
prose, which prevent translations from being what he called a “trial of the foreign”. 
 In this thesis I will compare two translations into English of the Dutch Civil 
Code. The first translation, by Haanappel (1990), employed a foreignizing translation 
strategy using predominantly Civil Law terminology. The second translation, by 
Warendorf, Thomas, and Curry-Sumner (2009), employed a more target culture-
oriented translation, avoiding terminology which Common Law readers would be 
unfamiliar with. The comparison will not only discuss discrepancies between the two 
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translations with regards to the choice of legal terminology, but will also investigate to 
what extent Berman’s deforming tendencies are present in either translation, and to 
what extent their presence actually affects the translation. 
 In Chapter 1, I will discuss existing theories on the nature of legal texts, legal 
language, differences between legal systems, and how these relate to legal translation. I 
will also go into what scholars have previously written about approaches to legal 
translation. Finally, I will outline Berman’s deforming tendencies and discuss how these 
could relate to the translation of legal texts. In Chapter 2, which forms the bulk of this 
thesis, I will discuss the source text and the translations under comparison, and the 
approaches that the translators of both translations took. The rest of the chapter consists 
of the annotated comparison of the two translations. I will conclude with presenting my 
most important findings and discussing their implications. 
  
 Buma 4 
 
1. Literature Review 
 
1.1. Legal Texts, Legal Language, and Legal Systems 
 
Cao (cited in Cornelius 2011, 124) states that legal translation is “the rendering of legal 
texts from the SL into the TL”. This is a rather simplistic definition that merely hints at 
the fact that legal translation is different from other types of translation and that leads 
one to believe there must be more going on. As Cornelius (2011, 124) notes, there exists 
a wide variety of legal texts, each of which are different in their scope, function, status, 
and effects. 
 But what makes legal texts so special? Šarčević (2006, 26) states that “a legal 
text can be regarded as a communicative occurrence between specialists intended to 
serve a particular function”. Harvey (2002, 178) disagrees with this statement, stating 
that legal texts are often in fact not restricted to specialists, but instead enable 
communication between specialists and non-specialists – for instance, documents such 
as contracts and judgments. According to Harvey, this communication between 
specialists and non-specialists is a feature that does not occur in many other types of 
special-purpose communication. Similarly, Hammel (cited in Burukina 2012, 583) 
distinguishes between 4 types of recipients: “legal practitioners whose background is 
known, clients whose identity is not known, a non-specialist audience [...], and a 
publication audience”. Each of these groups of possible recipients may require a 
different translation strategy – for example, translation for a non-specialist audience 
may require the translator to make the text easier to understand, whereas this would not 
be necessary in the case of a translation for legal practitioners. 
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 When it comes to types of legal texts, Burukina (2012, 571) distinguishes 
between four types: (1) academic texts, (2) juridical texts covering court judgments or 
law reports, (3) legislative or statutory texts, and (4) legal texts in which form 
determines the content, such as wills, powers of attorney, certificates, etc. Šarčević 
(2006, 26) further states that legal texts can be divided into prescriptive texts – statutes, 
treaties, contracts, among others – and descriptive texts – parts of documents used in 
judicial proceedings – although the latter can contain prescriptive parts as well. Harvey 
(2002, 179) again disagrees with this division, noting that whether a text is prescriptive 
or descriptive in function depends first and foremost on the communicative situation. A 
statute is merely informative when it is consulted out of interest by someone outside of 
the area in which it is in effect – the same goes for other types of legal texts in other 
situations. Cornelius (2011, 125) similarly states that the purposes of translated legal 
texts can vary immensely. As such, the translation of any legal text will require a 
different approach depending on its intended function, or skopos. 
 One of the points often raised about the peculiarities of legal translation is the 
nature of legal language (e.g. Aodha 2014, Burukina 2012, Cornelius 2011). Aodha 
(2014, 210) states that in law, similarly to poetry, matter and form are so closely tied 
that they cannot be separated. Additionally, as in poetry, each word is semantically 
unique, “even the most banal, grammatically flattened parts of speech. Style is 
determined by the nature of the court and the genius of the language in question” 
(Aodha 2014, 216). Additionally, Tiersma (2006, 553) notes that legal language is often 
seen as different from ordinary speech, due to the use of technical terminology, archaic 
or formal vocabulary, nominalizations, impersonal and passive constructions, multiple 
negation, long and complex sentences, and redundancy. Legal language that contains 
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these features is often referred to as legalese. According to Holland and Webb (cited in 
Burukina 2013, 576), the purpose of legalese is to conceal rather than to enhance one's 
understanding of a legal system, despite the function of legal texts as a means of 
communication between specialists and non-specialists, as noted earlier. However, there 
have been calls to make legal language more understandable to lay readers – such as the 
Plain English movement (see, for example, Hammel 2008). Nevertheless, it is 
important, according to De Groot (1996, 11), that one translates from one legal language 
to another legal language, as opposed to translating from one general language to 
another general language. 
 Legal translation is more than just a linguistic transfer. It is the transfer of a 
message in one legal system and its corresponding legal language into another legal 
system and its corresponding legal language (Chroma 2014). These legal languages are 
highly specific to the legal system in which they operate, and this is often where the 
difficulty in legal translation lies – even within a single language there can be multiple 
legal systems and, consequently, legal languages – for instance, English for England and 
Wales, the United States, Canada, Scotland, Australia, and South Africa. Conversely, in 
countries such as Belgium, multiple legal languages may be used within a single legal 
system. As such, legal translation often involves comparative law – translators must 
compare the concepts behind legal terminology in one system and find equivalents in 
the target legal language. Indeed, De Groot considers comparative law to be the core 
activity of the translation process (2012, 538). Šarčević also notes that lawyers often 
consider the legal aspect to be the main part of the translation process (2006, 26). Other 
scholars (Botezat 2012, 642; Burukina 2012, 579) similarly note that competence in 
legal languages and cultures represent the most valuable skills for the translator. 
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 As Cornelius (2011, 125) notes: “law is culture-dependent”. Each nation has a 
legal system with its own history, organization, and reasoning, designed to answer the 
needs of that particular nation. This inevitably leads to legal concepts between legal 
systems of different nations being incompatible (Botezat 2012, 641). This becomes 
especially relevant when translating into legal English. As Biel (cited in Burukina 2013, 
580) notes: “Is the target text intended for the UK, US, Australian or Canadian 
audience? If for the UK audience, is it England or Scotland with its distinct legal 
system? [...] Another problem arises when ‘the translation is intended for some 
undefined European audience, for which English is not a native language but is a lingua 
franca used to access texts written in languages of limited diffusion’.” 
 De Groot (1996) argues that translators should always translate to one target 
legal culture and corresponding legal language only, due to the difference in meaning in 
similar legal terms between similar legal systems mentioned above. Foster (2009, X), 
while agreeing in principle, argues that translators should not be overly zealous about 
translating to a single legal system – claiming that a particular term is untranslatable has 
no application in practice, and neologisms may not always be understood. De Groot 
(1996, 25) does note that a term from a third legal system may be used as a neologism if 
necessary. 
According to Aodha, the biggest obstacle in translation is “the absence of one-
to-one equivalents between elements of different languages”, such as culture-specific 
terms that frequently occur in legal texts. Words referring to objects or institutions 
specific to the source culture are nearly always untranslatable (Aodha 2014, 210). 
Mincke (cited in Aodha 2014, 211) argues that translation does not involve the 
transposition of a word with its meaning in one language to another. Translatability 
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depends on “whether the subject in question can be explained with a sufficient degree of 
accuracy”. Botezat (2012, 645) claims there are three types of terms: (1) those that have 
a semantic equivalent – terms that have the same informational content as the source 
term and serve the same legal purpose, (2) those that have a functional equivalent – 
which Botezat describes as terms that have “conceptual adequacy”, and Weston (cited in 
De Groot 1997, 17) defines as terms which embody the nearest situationally equivalent 
concept, (3) and those that are untranslatable and usually require additional description 
and information. Additionally, as Burukina (2014, 575) notes, legal language is filled 
with terms that are borrowed from general language, but can come to mean something 
else entirely in a legal context. Moreover, De Groot (1996, 9) remarks that, even within 
the same legal system, a single term can have different meanings depending on the legal 
context in which it is used. 
 
1.2. Approaches to Legal Translation 
 
Leung states that “[t]he traditional approach to legal translation is founded on the 
principle of fidelity to the source text”. As such, a large emphasis was placed on literal 
translation, especially in the case of legislation. Harvey (2002, 180) notes that the 
debate over fidelity to the “letter” or the “spirit” in legal translation dates back as far as 
the days of the Roman empire when formal correspondence between source and target 
text was thought to be essential to preserve the meaning of legal (and Biblical) 
documents. According to Harvey, this tendency to strictly adhere to the original text 
lasted until the twentieth century, when a greater appreciation for the bi- or multilingual 
nature of law in countries such as Switzerland, Belgium, and Canada resulted in a 
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greater respect for the “genius” of the target language. Cornelius (2011, 134) notes that 
this change seems to coincide with a changing role of the legal translator as merely a 
“passive mediator” to a more active participant in the legislative process, although 
naturally this would only apply to the translation or parallel drafting of legislative texts. 
 There are authors who call for a more functional approach, as Harvey (2002, 
180) notes – notably those influenced by Vermeer's skopos theory (Vermeer 2012). This 
theory, aimed more at general translation studies rather than solely at legal translation, 
states that a translation is predominantly determined by its skopos – meaning aim or 
purpose. As subordinate rules, a translation must be coherent with the receiver's 
situation – in other words, it must make sense to the receiver – and there must be 
fidelity to the ST information received by the translator. Note that this idea of fidelity is 
markedly different from the formal adherence to the source text mentioned above. 
Furthermore, these rules are in a hierarchical order, which means that the first concern 
of a translator should be to ensure that the translation fulfills its purpose, then ensure 
that the translation is coherent, and only after that ensure that the translation shows 
fidelity to the source text. This functionalist approach to legal translation may result in a 
more target-oriented translation – although this does not necessarily need to be the case. 
Similarly, according to Botezat (2012, 642), translation is a form of cultural interaction, 
where one replaces cultural elements in functional ways and adapts the text to the TC 
norms. For Botezat, the aim is to create communicative equivalence. 
 De Groot (1996, 15) notes that both the aim of the translation and its target 
audience are essential in determining whether differences between legal terms are 
relevant – for instance, De Groot would translate the term rechter-plaatsvervanger with 
deputy judge when translating a curriculum vitae, while merely translating with judge 
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would be deemed acceptable when translating a judgment, as the first translation would 
perhaps raise too many unnecessary questions. Similarly, Hammel (2008) argues that 
one of the core issues when deciding on a translation strategy is the target audience: 
"Take, for instance, the translation of a German rental contract into English, for a 
visiting businessperson or artist. Here, the premium is on clarity and jargon reduction, 
and the translator's freedom to trim and transpose at its zenith. These clients need to 
know what's expected of them, and have little interest in a faithful reproduction of the 
source language's grammatical structure or vocabulary." According to Hammel, 
translators should be allowed to make adjustments to the source text where necessary in 
order to create a more transparent and accessible translation, with the deciding factor 
being the audience of the translation. 
 Following Hammel, Burukina (2012, 587) who is also in favor of a more target-
oriented approach to legal translation, argues that translators should be allowed to use 
some of the tenets of the Plain English movement – most importantly, controlling 
sentence length – to produce clearer and more useful translations. Especially given that 
more and more legal translation into English is aimed at non-native speakers of English, 
Burukina claims, the use of plain-English in legal translation might become more of a 
necessity. Similarly, Joseph (1995, 17) argues that translators sometimes should be 
allowed or even required to change the style of the original in order to more faithfully 
convey the sense of the original, “unless that style and manner were somehow directly 
implicated in a question of the interpretation of the meaning of the original.” 
 Šarčević, while in favor of a receiver-oriented translation, disagrees with 
Vermeer's functional approach, stating that it does not account for “the fact that legal 
texts are subject to legal rules governing their usage in the mechanism of the law” 
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(2000: 2). Similarly, De Groot also notes that functional equivalence alone is not 
enough – the legal context, the way in which terms are embedded into the legal system, 
also needs to be taken into account. According to Šarčević, legal considerations are the 
most important aspect when it comes to the selection of a translation strategy. For 
Šarčević, the goal is to produce a text that shows formal correspondence between the 
source and the target text, but rather one that expresses “the uniform intent of the single 
instrument”, especially when the text is used by the courts (2000, 5). 
 Poon (cited in Leung 2014, 226) disagrees with Šarčević, arguing that “it is not 
easy for a translator to try to predict the way in which a text will be interpreted by the 
court and how the same legal effect might be achieved by the target text, especially 
given the indeterminacy of word meaning”. According to Poon, translators should try to 
create a “semantically and syntactically literal” translation that is faithful to the meaning 
of the source text, and leave interpretation to the court. However, in a later article 
Šarčević (2006,  27) herself mentions that “[a]ccuracy is […] essential, and as much 
attention must be paid to the content as to the intention and all possible interpretations 
and misinterpretations of the text. Translators must understand the source text but not 
interpret it in the legal sense. In particular, they must avoid value judgments, taking care 
to convey what is said in the source text, not what they believe it ought to say”. How 
this is to be reconciled with her previous statement that the translator must attempt to 
produce a translation that has the same legal effect is difficult to say. After all, how can 
one determine the legal effect of a text without interpreting it in a legal sense? 
 Many scholars disagree with Šarčević's claim that translators should avoid 
interpretation, stressing the importance of interpretation of the source text. Harvey 
(2002, 182) rightly points out that “translation, like any act of reading, necessarily 
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involves interpretation and that placing restrictions on this process prevents the 
translator from producing quality work”. Gémar (cited in Harvey, 2002) even suggests 
that legal translators should first and foremost be trained to interpret texts. For Leung 
(2014, 226), any act of interpretation is a preliminary step of translation. Similarly, for 
Beaupré (cited in Cornelius 2011, 136) the effective translation of legislation is 
dependent on the ability of the legal translator to apply judicial methods of 
interpretation. Whether or not legal interpretation is required, the translator must always 
be able to understand what is conveyed in the source text. 
 Bednarek (cited in Cornelius 2011, 136) also emphasizes the importance of an 
analysis of the source text, stating that the translator should bear in mind that translation 
involves two kinds of transfer, namely intercultural transfer and legal transfer. The 
analysis of the source text is also important when it comes to selecting an appropriate 
translation strategy. 
 When it comes to dealing with ambiguities in the source text, Harvey (2002,181) 
notes that the translator does not necessarily need to resolve them. According to Harvey, 
ambiguities in contracts could be used to reach a compromise, or to purposefully create 
uncertainties which either of the parties will seek to exploit. Ambiguity can furthermore 
function as a diplomatic tactic in the case of international legislation. Harvey notes that 
legal texts are in this regard similar to literary texts, as ambiguity is seen  “not a defect 
but as an inherent feature which should be retained in translation”. In this respect, 
Harvey notes, interpretation of legal texts is required in order to identify these 
ambiguities, and consequently decide whether or not to maintain them in the translation. 
 
There have been a few attempts to describe the general process and the steps that 
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translators should employ when it comes to legal translation. Li (2014,87 1) notes that 
translation process research in general translation studies generally is not useful with 
regards to legal translation. Li introduces the idea of static equivalence, which he 
contrasts to Eugene Nida's dynamic equivalence. According to Li, static equivalence is 
similar to “literal translation, semantic translation or foreignization in terms of 
preserving the literal or semantic meaning of the original”, although it is still quite 
different. (Li 2014, 188). Unfortunately, Li fails to specify exactly in what way static 
equivalence differs from the above approaches. He states that, by applying static 
equivalence, the translator can achieve “complete equivalence […] in terms of in-depth 
meaning, surface meaning, semantic meaning, structural compositions, style, register, 
and even linguistic format” – quite ambitious, indeed. 
 According to Li, the nature of legal texts demand for static equivalents, as legal 
language itself is static. By static, Li means that legal texts are often drafted on the basis 
of certain guidelines regarding sentence patterns, style, format, word choice, etc. Any 
translation needs to reflect this, or it will deviate from the original. Li states that this is 
especially important with regards to the translation of legal terms, as these terms reflect 
a specific meaning depending on their legal context. A dynamic translation will change 
this specific meaning, causing the translation to lose its authenticity, and deviate from 
the original. While Li's claims here may have some value with regards to the translation 
of legislative texts and contracts that will be used as authoritative texts themselves, we 
have already seen that some translations might allow for a more dynamic approach, 
depending on their communicative function. 
 Li's proposed model for achieving static equivalence entails 5 steps: 
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1. Browse the text to determine the text-type, target readership, translation 
principle, and strategies; 
2. Peruse the text and decode the intent of the writer; 
3. Conduct grammatical and operative analysis to determine the way of 
expression; 
4. Cross-linguistic transfer; and 
5. Equivalence check and back-translation. 
(Li 2014, 203) 
 
Of these steps, the equivalence check and back-translation is the most important, 
according to Li, as this is where any deviations from the source text will become the 
most apparent. 
 Chroma agrees with Li in that each legal system brings with it its own rules for 
legal language use, and determines the legal and linguistic elements that make a legal 
text valid. This should be taken into account when translating, according to Chroma. 
Furthermore, every legal text is subject to interpretation by its receiver, and when 
translated, this interpretation is diverted, i.e. the translator becomes both a secondary 
interpreter and receiver. The role of the translator is then to bridge the gap between the 
source law and legal language and the receiver (Chroma 2014, 122-123). 
 As such, legal translation does not only entail linguistic transfer, but also a 
transfer in legal systems, according to Chroma (2014, 124-125). Because of this, it is 
necessary for translators to compare the legal systems of the source language and the 
target language before they attempt a translation. Chroma describes the (simplified) 
process of legal translation as follows: 
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1. decoding SL message; 
2. interpreting SL message in context; 
3. encoding interpreted message into TL; 
4. adapting TT to purpose and communicative function of translation. 
(Chroma 2014, 126) 
 
Judging from the process described above, Chroma puts a lot of emphasis on the 
message that is conveyed and the purpose of the ST and TT, and stresses the fact that the 
translation has to “make sense” to the receiver. In order to achieve this, the translator 
needs to be proficient in both the source language and legal system and the target 
language and legal system, so that they can produce a comparative analysis of those 
systems. 
 
1.3. Berman's Deforming Tendencies 
 
For Berman (2012), translation is “the trial of the foreign”. In other words, translations 
should reveal and accentuate the foreignness of a foreign work. However, according to 
Berman this aim has been skewed due to a distinction between two kinds of translations 
– “literary”  and “non-literary” translations. 
 
“Whereas the latter perform only a semantic transfer and deal with texts 
that entertain a relation of exteriority or instrumentality to their language, 
the former are concerned with works, that is to say texts so bound to their 
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language that the translating act inevitably becomes a manipulation of 
signifiers, where two languages enter into various forms of collision and 
somehow couple. This is undeniable, but not taken seriously.”   
(Berman 2012, 241) 
 
According to Berman the “non-literary” translation approach is so dominant that, even 
in literary translation, foreign aspects are naturalized. 
 Berman then sets forth a system of twelve deforming tendencies that he claims 
are present in every translation and prevent them from accentuating their foreignness. 
 The first of these is rationalization, which relates mainly to the syntactical 
structure of the source text. Elements such as repetition, punctuation, long sentences, or 
sentences without verbs are all at risk of rationalization, if they do not adhere to a 
certain idea of order (Berman 2012, 244). 
 The second deforming tendency, which Berman relates to the first one, is 
clarification. He notes that all translation comprises some degree of explicitation, 
although that can mean two different things: (1) the manifestation of something that is 
not apparent, but concealed in the original, shining new light on it, but it can also mean 
(2) the explicitation of something that is not meant to be made clear in the original. 
 The third tendency, expansion, comes somewhat as a result of the previous two 
tendencies, as both of them often require expanding the mass of the original text. 
However, according to Berman, such expansions are often empty, and add nothing to 
the translation, meaning they do not augment the original's way of speaking. Moreover, 
they stretch the original, disturbing its rhythm. 
 The fourth tendency is ennoblement. Berman calls ennoblement a “rewriting”, a 
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“stylistic exercise” meant to produce a more “elegant” text based on the original. 
Ennoblement aims to make the translation more “readable”, getting rid of the original 
clumsiness and complexity of the source text. 
 The fifth deforming tendency, qualitative impoverishment, refers to replacing 
terms, expressions, and figures in the source text with words in the target text that lack 
their “iconic” richness. According to Berman, a word is iconic when it “creates an 
image”, in relation to its referent, when it manages to capture something of the referents 
physicality. When this replacement occurs throughout a work, it detracts from the works 
expressiveness, according to Berman. 
 The sixth tendency is quantitative impoverishment, and refers to lexical loss. 
According to Berman, works can contain multiple signifiers for the same signified, 
without justifying their choice in a particular instance Any translation that does not 
respect this variety makes the original work less recognizable. 
 The seventh deforming tendency is the destruction of rhythms. According to 
Berman, novels are no less rhythmic than poetry. Berman notes, however, that novels 
are less fragile in this respect than poems, although elements such as punctuation can 
still easily destroy the rhythm of a novel. 
 The eighth tendency is the destruction of underlying networks of signification. 
Berman states that literary works often contain an “underlying text”, where signifiers 
link up and form certain networks. Furthermore, authors often choose to use certain 
words, and avoid the use of others (Berman 2012, 249). Translations that ignore these 
aspects of a text destroy its underlying rhythm. 
 The ninth tendency is the destruction of linguistic patternings, and refers to the 
systematic nature of the text with regards to the construction of sentences. Translators 
 Buma 18 
 
who employ rationalization, clarification, expansion, and other approaches destroy this 
systematic nature, making the text more inconsistent, with different kinds of writing in 
the same text, causing the translation to lack the distinguishing features of the original. 
 The tenth deforming tendency is the destruction of vernacular networks or their 
exoticization. The translation of vernacular language, which occurs frequently in prose, 
is always problematic. Terms will either be replaced with a more general construction, 
which hurts the expressiveness of the original, or they may be exoticized, meaning the 
original term may be placed in italics, or it may be replaced with vernacular that is local 
to the target text. Neither of these is ideal, according to Berman, as vernacular is very 
much rooted in the location where it is used. 
 The eleventh deforming tendency is the destruction of expressions and idioms, 
and is in part related to the previous one, as expressions and idioms often derive from 
the vernacular language. The replacement of idioms and expressions with their 
equivalents in the target culture will create an absurd effect, where characters from the 
source culture will express themselves in images related to the target culture. According 
to Berman, one should not search for equivalents for idioms and expressions, as they do 
not necessarily translate them. Rather, Berman suggests there is such a thing as a 
proverb consciousness which will detect new proverbs as equivalents to the authentic 
ones in the target culture. 
 The twelfth and final deforming tendency is the effacement of the 
superimposition of languages, and deals with the relation between a dialect, sociolect, 
or idiolect and a common language, or two different kinds of common languages within 
a text. This difference between dialect and common language is often lost in translation, 
causing the translation to become more homogeneous than the original. 
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 Because Berman’s system of deforming tendencies was predominantly aimed at 
the translation of literary prose, not all of the deforming tendencies may be as relevant 
to the translation of legal texts. For example, due to the nature of legal texts and legal 
language, the final three tendencies –  destruction of vernacular networks, the 
destruction of expressions and idioms, and the effacement of the superimposition of 
languages – might not need to be discussed at all. 
According to Berman (2012, 252), the idea that translation is, first and foremost, 
the restitution of meaning, goes back to the Platonic figure of translation, in which 
meaning and the letter are separated. All translation as such is the destruction of the 
letter in favor of meaning. Berman, then, suggests that one should translate “to the 
letter”, as this restores the signifying process of works, which is more than their 
meaning. However, Berman does not explicitly say whether or not one should sacrifice 
meaning in favor of the letter. On this subject, Joseph (1995, 17) argues that, in legal 
translation, departure from meaning – or “sense” – is unthinkable, as the consequences 
of doing so are qualitatively different from those in literary translation.  
Joseph (1995, 19) argues that translators of legal texts are often forced to adopt 
“conventional legal formulations of the target language with no acknowledgement of 
the differences in legal systems”. According to Joseph, this is because legal texts, and 
especially legislative texts, depend for their authority on the fiction that they do not 
have a specific author, and consequently, the translator must disappear as well. Joseph 
(1995, 34) proposes, however, that translators should make themselves visible in the 
translation. They should do this by interpreting the source text, rather than merely 
translating it. They should intervene in texts semantically and stylistically, to the extent 
called for, in order to undo the absence of the author and the translator. Finally, while 
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translators should not ignore the importance of clear writing, the desire to provide easy 
reading should not sacrifice fully interpretative translation in favor of the simple legal 
conventions of the target language where the legal systems differ or where the source 
text includes connotations that a target language equivalent cannot capture. 
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2. Analysis 
 
2.1. Texts 
 
For this analysis, two published translations from Dutch to English of the Dutch Civil 
Code were selected. The first translation, published in 1990, by Haanappel, and the 
second translation, published in 2009, by Warendorf, Thomas, and Curry-Sumner. 
 The recodification of the Dutch Civil Code (Du. Burgerlijk Wetboek) was  a long 
process which began in 1947, with the bulk of the New Civil Code entering into force in 
1992. Whereas the old 1838 Civil Code was heavily influenced by the French 
Napoleonic Code, the New Civil Code (Du. Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek) saw some 
changes which are reminiscent of the German Civil Code model. This is reflected both 
in new terminology used – e.g. the term rechtshandeling, which did not appear in the 
1838 Code and is similar to the German Rechtsgeschäft – and in its structure – as 
Bernstein (1989, 122-123) notes, civil codes relying on the German model often include 
rules on obligations, property, family law, and decedent’s estates, preceded by a 
“General Part” which contains rules applicable to all subject matters of private law. 
While the structure of the Dutch New Civil Code as a whole still slightly differs from 
this, it is reflected in the structure of Books 3, 5, 6, and 7, with Book 3 constituting the 
general part of the vermogensrecht, which is then expanded upon in Books 5, 6, and 7. 
The Dutch government has no established policy on the publication of English 
translations of Dutch Legislation, even though, as Warendorf et al. note, a significant 
amount of its people does not understand Dutch – notably those in the Netherlands 
Antilles. Furthermore, Warendorf et al note that English translations of the Dutch Civil 
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Code are often used in the codification of private law in countries such as China and 
countries which became independent after the dissolution of the USSR. 
 As mentioned above, the Haanappel translation was published in 1990, and was 
part of a project to translate Books 3, 5, 6, and 7 of the Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek into 
both English and French. The French translation was done by E.J. Mackaay, but falls 
outside the scope of this thesis and as such will not be discussed in much detail. The 
translation occurred at the same time as the publication of the Quebec Civil Code 
Revision Office’s Report on the Civil Code of Quebec, which contained a complete 
English and French draft of the New Quebec Civil Code. As Haanappel notes, both the 
Civil Code of the Netherlands of 1838 and the Civil Code of Lower Canada (Quebec) of 
1866 are based on the 1804 Code civil des Français. As such, the terminology of the 
Haanappel translation “relies heavily on the terminology used in French code of 1804, 
and Quebec code of 1866, and the 1977 Quebec Draft Civil Code, and various Quebec 
Bills and Draft Bills”. Furthermore, the translator made a deliberate attempt to use 
terminology found in English civil law – as opposed to common law – such as those 
contained in the aforementioned texts, as well as sources found in English language 
civil law systems such as the State of Louisiana, Scotland, and South Africa. De Groot 
(1996, 26) notes that the reception of the Haanappel translation by English lawyers 
tends to be somewhat negative. De Groot disagrees however, noting that Haanappel 
indicated from the outset that the translation would use terms found in the Quebec legal 
system and that it does so consistently. However, De Groot does admit that, because of 
this, the translation is perhaps not as accessible for anyone not familiar with the Quebec 
legal system and language. 
The translation by Warendorf, Thomas, and Curry-Sumner, which was a 
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translation of the complete Dutch Civil Code from Dutch to English, was first published 
in 2009, with a second edition published in 2013. The translation benefited from earlier 
translations of the Dutch Civil Code – notably the 1990 translation by Haanappel, but 
also a translation of Books 1 and 4 in Family Law and Legislation of the Netherlands by 
Curry-Sumner and Warendorf, Book 2 in Companies and Other Legal Persons under 
Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles Law by Warendorf and Thomas and an updated 
version of the original Haanappel translation from 1999-2007 by Haanappel, Mackaay, 
Warendorf and Thomas published in Netherlands Business Legislation. The aim was to 
create a translation that would be understandable for readers familiar with common law, 
with the translators noting they were forced to make many difficult decisions between 
common law and civil law terms. Finally, the translators generally tried to avoid the use 
of Latin legal terms, or specific civil law terms for which general common law readers 
would require a dictionary. 
 
2.2. Selection Criteria 
 
Obviously a comparison of the entire Dutch Civil Code translation would fall outside 
the scope of this thesis. As noted above, the Haanappel translation only covers Book 3, 
5, 6, and 7, so a complete comparison would be impossible to begin with. Book 3 – 
which on its own spans 326 Articles – was selected as the area of vermogensrecht 
should contain a fair amount of discrepancies between Common Law and Civil Law 
with regards to legal concepts and terminology. Subsequently, a number of articles 
spread across Book 3 were selected in order to obtain a decent variety in legal 
terminology. However, because the analysis of Berman’s deforming tendencies does 
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require some repetition, as they apply to texts as a whole, a certain extent of consistency 
in source text legal terminology was required. As such, a number of subsequent articles 
of the Title 1 of Book 3 were selected, as these contain many internal references. 
The two different translations were selected first and foremost because they are 
both published translations that contain a translator’s preface explaining the general 
approach the translators took. Judging a specific translation choice is difficult when one 
does not know what sort of translation strategy a translator employed. While the 
translation by Warendorf et al. does draw from the Haanappel translation, the fact that 
the Warendorf translation aims to be understandable to Common Law readers, while this 
does not seem to be a goal for the Haanappel translation, should make for the necessary 
differences between the two translations, at least with regards to the translation of legal 
terminology. 
Another reason why these two translations were selected for comparison is due 
to the different receptions they both received. While, as noted earlier, the Haanappel 
translation received somewhat mixed responses, the translation by Warendorf et al. is 
considered authoritative by Dutch lawyers (Chroma, 2014 137). This is especially of 
note considering the fact that the Warendorf translation was drew from the Haanappel 
translation, as noted earlier. 
 
2.3. Methodology 
 
For this thesis, the two translations were put side by side and compared to the Dutch 
source text and to each other. The Haanappel translation is shown on the left, while the 
translation by Warendorf et al. is shown on the right. Terms or phrases reflecting 
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relevant issues with regards to legal translation or different approaches taken by the 
translators are emboldened and discussed in annotations directly below each section. 
Any terms or other parts of the translation that constitute any of Berman’s deforming 
tendencies are also emboldened, with the deforming tendencies indicated between 
square brackets with the following numbers: 
 
[1] – rationalization 
[2] – clarification 
[3] – expansion 
[4] – ennoblement and popularization 
[5] – qualitative impoverishment 
[6] – quantitative impoverishment 
[7] – the destruction of rhythms 
[8] – the destruction of underlying networks of signification 
[9] – the destruction of linguistic patterns 
[10] – the destruction of vernacular networks or their exoticization 
[11] – the destruction of expressions and idioms 
[12] – the destruction of the superimposition of languages 
 
Note that, while the full list of deforming tendencies is shown here, not all deforming 
tendencies may appear in the translation. 
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2.3. Annotated Comparison 
 
Boek 3. Vermogensrecht in het algemeen [N.B.: In the Haanappel translation, this 
Book is titled “Algemene gedeelte van het verbintenissenrecht” – the same as Book 6. 
Whether this is a printing error or not is unknown to me.] 
Patrimonial law: Vermogensrecht encompasses both the goederenrecht and the 
verbintenissenrecht (Loonstra 2009, 20). According to Fockema Andreae’s Juridisch 
Woordenboek, it is the body of rules governing “subjectieve vermogensrechten”, which 
in turn are roughly defined as “eigendom en andere rechten”. A full definition can be 
found in Article 6 of Book 3 of the Dutch Civil Code. In Black’s Law Dictionary, 
patrimony is defined as “[a]n estate inherited from one’s father or other ancestor; legacy 
or heritage”, from the Roman law patrimonium: “[p]roperty that is capable of being 
inherited; private property”. An alternative definition of patrimony, specific to Civil 
Law, reads: “[a]ll of a person’s assets and liabilities that are capable of monetary 
valuation and subject to execution for a creditor’s benefit”. The latter definition, which 
downplays the aspect of inheritance, seems to reflect the more current usage, which is 
further confirmed by the decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in In re Howard 
Marshall Charitable Remainder Annuity Trust (1998): “Under Louisiana law, the 
patrimony is a coherent mass of existing or potential rights and liabilities attached to a 
person for the satisfaction of his economic needs. The patrimony, as a universality of 
rights and obligations, is ordinarily attached to a person until termination of 
personality”. The term patrimony, however, is uncommon in Common Law 
Patrimonial law in general The law of property, proprietary rights 
and interests[2][3][5] 
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jurisdictions, resulting in a translation that has a foreignizing effect on many English 
readers.  
The law of property, proprietary rights and interests: In the translation by 
Warendorf et al., the translators have chosen for a paraphrase of the source term, 
resulting in clarification and expansion, as the translation is a rough denotation of the 
meaning of the source text term. This results in a translation that can be traced back to 
neither Common Law nor Civil Law, as Common Law lacks a term that encompasses 
vermogensrecht as a whole. Unfortunately, other sources which contain the phrase seem 
to be lacking, although the individual terms do appear in Black’s Law Dictionary. In 
Berman’s terms, however, the phrase does not carry the “iconic richness” which is 
present in vermogensrecht – it is merely a denotation – resulting in qualitative 
impoverishment. 
 
[…] 
 
Artikel 1 
Goederen zijn alle zaken en alle vermogensrechten. 
is comprised of: Here, both translations use is comprised of as a translation for zijn. 
This results in rationalization, as it produces a translation which is more “natural” or 
idiomatic than a literal translation would have been. Consequently, the translation 
results in clarification, as it explains what is in the source text. As a result, the 
Property is comprised of [1][2][3] all 
things and of all patrimonial rights. 
Property is comprised of[1][2][3] all 
things and of all proprietary rights and 
interests[2][3][5]. 
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translation is “stretched out” when compared to the original, resulting in expansion. It is 
of note here that the semantic relationship between the terms goederen, and zaken and 
vermogensrechten is hyponymous, i.e. goederen is a hypernym of zaken and 
vermogensrechten, which are its hyponyms – it could also more specifically be classified 
as a taxonomic relationship. In this sense, using a form of to comprise  (Du. omvatten) 
is appropriate. To contrast this, in Article 2, for example, the relationship between the 
word zaken and the phrase “de voor menselijke beheersing vatbare stoffelijke objecten” 
is synonymous. 
 However, it should be noted that the phrase is comprised of itself is one that is 
the subject of some debate. According Merriam-Webster (2016), initial usage of 
comprise indicated that it means “to be made up of” – in passive form – with recent 
usage adding another definition in “to make up” – the latter often being used in the 
passive sense “to be comprised of”, such as seen above. Additionally, the British 
National Corpus yields 883 results for “comprises”, whereas “is comprised of” only 
yields 23 results. As such, while the way in which comprised is used is not necessarily 
wrong, it can be seen as risky, especially as the translators did not need to use the 
modulation from active to passive, and simply could have used comprises. Tying this 
back to Berman’s deforming tendencies, while the clarification, using to comprise as a 
translation for zijn may have been necessary, the rewriting of active into passive, which 
appears to be mainly a choice with regards to style, is not only unnecessary, but perhaps 
even incorrect. 
things: Fockema Andreae defines zaak as “voorwerp, voor menselijke beheersing 
vatbaar stoffelijk object; ingedeeld in roerend en onroerend”. Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines things as “[t]he subject matter of a right, whether it is a material object or not; 
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any subject matter of ownership within the sphere of proprietary or valuable rights”. 
Furthermore, in the Lousiana Civil Code, things can notably be both corporeal and 
incorporeal, the latter of which is defined as “things that have no body, but are 
comprehended by the understanding, such as the rights of inheritance, servitudes, 
obligations, and right of intellectual property”. As such, there seems to be some 
discrepancy between the definition of zaken and that of things, where zaken are 
exclusively corporeal, while things can be both corporeal and incorporeal. For an 
alternative translation, we may turn to the French Law biens, which, according to 
Black’s Law Dictionary, means “[g]oods, property. […] Biens includes real property in 
most civil-law jurisdictions”, although here again the tangible aspect is not explicitized. 
Additionally, biens is a fairly obscure term which does not see a lot of use even in 
English language Civil Law systems – as can be seen above, the Louisiana Civil Code 
uses the term things. Furthermore, because the definition of zaken is found in Article 4, 
the translators may have decided that the discrepancy between the two terms was 
irrelevant, and that things could function as what Rayar (1997, xvii) calls a label for the 
Dutch term zaken. 
 Alternatively however, if the translators wished to use a term which is more 
accessible to Common Law readers, chattels in possession or choses in possession may 
have been an option. As Zwalve (2008, 190) notes, chattels personal are divided into 
chattels in possession and chattels in action, the first of which are corporeal objects, or 
tangibles, and thus come close to the definition of zaken.  
proprietary rights and interests: Warendorf et al. here have chosen to translate with 
proprietary rights for vermogensrechten, the same term they used for their translation of 
vermogensrecht in the title of Book 3. It is important to note that, in Dutch law, a 
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vermogensrecht has two definitions (Loonstra 2009, 163-164): (1) all rights (and 
liabilities) which have monetary value – these can be either real rights (such as the right 
of ownership) or personal rights – in Dutch, hét vermogensrecht, which encompasses 
the goederenrecht and the verbintenissenrecht; or (2) a non-tangible object (as opposed 
to a tangible thing) that has financial value – the vermogensrechten which we are 
dealing with here, as defined in Article 6. The current translation does not reflect this, or 
is at least much more general. Black’s Law Dictionary defines proprietary rights as “[a] 
right that is part of a person’s estate, assets, or property, as opposed to a right arising 
from a person’s legal status”, while interest simply means “[a] legal share in something 
[…]”. This generalization results in qualitative impoverishment, in addition to not 
accurately reflecting the meaning of the source text term. 
 
Artikel 2 
Zaken zijn de voor menselijke beheersing vatbare stoffelijke objecten. 
 
[…] 
 
Artikel 3 
1 Onroerend zijn de grond, de nog niet gewonnen delfstoffen, de met de grond 
verenigde beplantingen, alsmede de gebouwen en werken die duurzaam met de grond 
zijn verenigd, hetzij rechtstreeks, hetzij door vereniging met andere gebouwen of 
werken. 
Things are corporeal objects susceptible of 
human control. 
Things are corporeal objects which can be 
subject to human control. 
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The following are immovable: Here both translators have chosen to adjust the sentence 
structure in order to create a more idiomatic translation, as this allowed them to 
maintain end focus. This rationalization in order to produce a more idiomatic translation 
subsequently leads to expansion and clarification, as the translators were forced to insert 
an additional subject into the first clause. Consequently, the parallelism between this 
paragraph and the following paragraph (“Onroerend zijn […]”, “Roerend zijn […]”) is 
lost – a destruction of linguistic patterns –although attempting to maintain this 
parallelism would arguably have led to an unnecessarily unidiomatic translation. In 
Berman’s terms, the translators seemed to be concerned more with maintaining the 
meaning rather than the letter (form), although whether this is an issue is debatable – the 
legal interpretation of the translation when compared to the source text is unlikely to be 
affected. 
plants growing on land: Here Warendorf et al. have chosen to give their interpretation 
to what is said in the source text, in order to produce a more “natural” translation. This 
choice results in rationalization and clarification. Apart from being a deformation, this 
could arguably cause the translation be interpreted differently from the source text – the 
two phrases do not necessarily have the same meaning, after all – although this would 
require a very literal interpretation. 
1. The following are 
immovable[1][2][3][9]: land, unextracted 
minerals, plants attached to land, buildings 
and works durably united with land, either 
directly or through incorporation with 
other buildings or works. 
1. The following are 
immovable[1][2][3][9]: land, unextracted 
minerals, plants growing on land[1][2], 
buildings and works durably united with 
land, either directly or by incorporation 
with other buildings or works. 
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durably: Here, both translators have chosen to translate duurzaam literally. While this 
does not necessarily result in a deformation – in fact, Berman would probably approve 
of such a literal translation – it is worth noting that, in the case of the Warendorf 
translation, which aims at producing a translation which is accessible to a Common Law 
audience, we may find a Common Law alternative in permanently. Even with regards to 
the Haanappel translation, which did not aim at using Common Law terminology, it is 
worth noting that both the Civil Code of Quebec and the Louisiana Civil Code use 
permanently (or of a permanent nature in case of the former). 
 
2 Roerend zijn alle zaken die niet onroerend zijn. 
All things which are movable,: Here, the translators have chosen to use a comma 
where it is simply not necessary. Both translations, like the source text, contain a 
restrictive relative clause, which do not require the use of a comma either before or after 
the clause (as opposed to a non-restrictive relative clause). This seems to be a form of 
rationalization where the translators may have thought inserting a comma would 
improve the readability of the translation. 
All things which are not immovable, are movable: In addition to the unnecessary use 
of punctuation, both translations contain changes to the structure of the source text in 
order to create a more idiomatic translation, destroying the linguistic patterns of the 
source text – i.e. the parallelism between Article3(1) and 3(2). It could be seen as a 
necessary change, as maintaining the sentence structure of the source text would result 
in a grammatically unusual translation. However, it would have been possible to alter 
2. All things which are not 
immovable,[1] are movable.[1][9] 
2. All things which are not immovable, 
are movable.[1][9] 
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the sentence structure of this paragraph and the previous one in such a way that at least 
the parallelism between the two paragraphs would have been maintained. 
 
Artikel 4 
1 Al hetgeen volgens verkeersopvatting onderdeel van een zaak uitmaakt, is bestanddeel 
van die zaak. 
component part: Here again, we see what seems to be a literal translation of the source 
text term, although it is also quite possible that Haanappel drew inspiration from the 
Louisiana Civil Code, which also contains the term component part (the Civil Code of 
Quebec uses integral part). Again, while this is not necessarily a deformation as 
Berman would see it, there is one point worth noting. Much like in previous cases (e.g. 
the translation of duurzaam discussed above), Warendorf et al. have followed the 
translation of Haanappel, despite the availability of a perfectly viable Common Law 
translation. In Black’s Law Dictionary, fixtures is defined as “[p]ersonal property that is 
attached to land or a building and that is regarded as an irremovable part of the real 
property […]”. This definition coincides perfectly with the definition of bestanddeel 
found in Article 4(2) below. It seems strange that the translation by Warendorf et al., 
which was meant to be accessible to a Common Law audience, would use component 
part over fixture. 
A component part of a thing is anything which, according to common opinion, 
forms part of that thing: Here we see another case of rationalization with regards to 
1. A component part of a thing is 
anything which, according to common 
opinion, forms part of that thing.[1] 
1. A component part of a thing is 
anything commonly considered to form 
part of that thing.[1] 
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sentence structure, with the two clauses being interchanged, although in this case it is 
arguably unnecessary. Maintaining the structure of the source text would have created a 
translation that is perfectly grammatically correct. On the other hand, if the aim of legal 
translation is to create a target text which expresses “uniform intent”, as Šarčević  
argues, the existing translations are perfectly acceptable. 
 
2 Een zaak die met een hoofdzaak zodanig verbonden wordt dat zij daarvan niet kan 
worden afgescheiden zonder dat beschadiging van betekenis wordt toegebracht aan een 
der zaken, wordt bestanddeel van de hoofdzaak. 
A thing which is attached to a principal thing in such a manner that it cannot be 
separated therefrom without substantial damage being done to either: Another case 
of unnecessary use of commas. For a more detailed discussion, see the annotation under 
Article3(2). 
 
[…] 
 
Artikel 6 
Rechten die, hetzij afzonderlijk hetzij tezamen met een ander recht, overdraagbaar zijn, 
of er toe strekken de rechthebbende stoffelijk voordeel te verschaffen, ofwel verkregen 
2. A thing which is attached to a principal 
thing in such a manner that it cannot be 
separated therefrom without substantial 
damage being done to either,[1] becomes a 
component part of that thing. 
2. A thing attached to a principal thing in 
such a manner that it cannot be separated 
therefrom without substantial damage 
being done to either,[1] becomes a 
component part of that thing. 
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zijn in ruil voor verstrekt of in het vooruitzicht gesteld stoffelijk voordeel, zijn 
vermogensrechten. 
Proprietary rights: For the issue regarding the translation of vermogensrechten as 
proprietary rights, see the annotation under Article 1. What is of note here is that, in 
Article 1, Warendorf et al. translated vermogensrechten as “proprietary rights and 
interests” [emphasis mine], and here we see that the interests have suddenly 
disappeared. This is an example of the destruction of underlying networks of 
signification which undermines the internal references within the translation. 
Additionally, it leads readers to wonder what the actual significance of that term was. If 
a term is not important enough to include in the translation in subsequent appearances, 
one wonders why it was included in the first place. 
any rights of a proprietary nature[1][2][3]: Warendorf et al. have chosen to 
explicitize the term proprietary rights, where the source text does not. However, it is 
debatable what purpose this serves – one would assume that the proprietary nature of 
proprietary rights is implicit in the term itself, as is also shown in the definition of 
proprietary rights in Black’s Law Dictionary: “[a] right that is part of a person’s estate, 
Patrimonial rights are those which, either 
separately or together with another right, 
are transferable; rights[1][2][3] which are 
intended to procure a material benefit to 
their holder; or rights[1][2][3] which have 
been acquired in exchange for actual 
expected material benefit. 
Proprietary rights[8] are any rights of a 
proprietary nature[1][2][3] which, either 
separately or together with another right, 
are transferable; rights[1][2][3] which are 
intended to procure a tangible benefit to 
their holder, or rights[1][2][3] which have 
been acquired in exchange for actual or 
expected tangible benefit. 
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assets, or property, as opposed to a right arising from the person’s legal status”. 
Additionally, this attempt at clarification arguably does little to actually clarify the 
source text term, and merely leads to unnecessary expansion of the text. 
rights: Here the word rights (Du. rechten) has been explicitized in each instance where 
it is omitted in the source text, resulting in expansion. One could argue that it is 
somewhat unnecessary, although it has no effect on the interpretation of the translation. 
On the other hand, it is a useful explicitation in that it divides the sentence up into 
separate pieces and reminds the reader of the topic each time, making for a translation 
which is more easily understandable. 
 
 
Artikel 7 
Een afhankelijk recht is een recht dat aan een ander recht zodanig verbonden is, dat het 
niet zonder dat andere recht kan bestaan. 
dependent right: A literal translation of the source text term, dependent right does not 
appear in Black’s Law Dictionary, nor in the Louisiana Civil Code or the Civil Code of 
Quebec, making it difficult to trace why the translators decided on this translation. As 
such, it could be described as a foreignizing translation choice, although, as mentioned 
above, neologisms may not always be understood. An alternative translation which is 
more common in English jurisdictions would be accessory right. Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines accessory right as “[a] supplementary right that has been added to 
A dependent right is one which is related 
to another right in such a fashion that it 
cannot exist independently thereof [4]. 
A dependent right is one which is related 
to another right in such a way that it cannot 
exist independently thereof [4]. 
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the main right that is vested in the same owner”. Coincidentally, accessory right is used 
both in the Louisiana Civil Code and the Civil Code of Quebec. 
thereof: Usage of pronominal adverb is a feature of legalese, although it arguably does 
not affect the readability of the target text too much in this case. However, this 
translation deforms the text in that it alters the style of the original to be more “elegant” 
or “refined”, which is unnecessary. An acceptable alternative translation which avoids 
both legalese and deformations would have been “[…] independently of that other 
right”. As an additional note, this deformation shows that Berman’s system of 
deforming tendencies might not be entirely complete. Whereas Berman lists 
clarification and expansion as deforming tendencies, this translation does exactly the 
opposite – it makes vague what is clear in the source text and compresses it. These 
deformations do not seem to appear in the system that Berman has laid out. 
 
Artikel 8 
Een beperkt recht is een recht dat is afgeleid uit een meer omvattend recht, hetwelk met 
het beperkte recht is bezwaard. 
dismembered right/limited right: Fockema Andreae defines beperkte rechten as 
“dochterrechten, afgeleid uit meer omvattende (moeder)rechten die met [beperkte 
rechten] zijn bezwaard”. Loonstra (2009, 179-180) explains that, in many cases, the 
moederrecht is the right of ownership (Du. eigendomsrecht), and beperkte rechten may 
A dismembered right is one which is 
derived from a more comprehensive right, 
the latter being encumbered with the 
dismembered right. 
A limited right is one which is derived 
from a more comprehensive right which is 
encumbered with the limited right. 
 Buma 38 
 
be such rights as the right of usufruct (Du. vruchtgebruik) or easements (Du. 
erfdienstbaarheid). As such, the term dismembered right most likely refers to the 
dismemberment of ownership. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, in Civil Law, 
“[t]he right of ownership may be dismembered and its components conveyed in the 
form of independent real rights, such as the right of use, the right of usufruct, and the 
right of security”. The term also appears in the English version of the Civil Code of 
Quebec, which may have prompted the translators to choose this particular translation. 
At first sight, limited right seems to be merely a literal translation of beperkt 
recht. Although it does not appear in Black’s Law Dictionary, it can be found in a 
number of publications on property law – along with a variation of it: limited property 
rights (see, for example, Bouckaert 2010, 34). Although this term may be more difficult 
to find in other publications, one excuse for such a translation may be the fact that the 
term is defined in the text itself. 
However, if we wish to find a Common Law alternative, we may turn to a term 
which both translations already seem to hint at, namely encumbrance. Encumbrance is 
defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “[a] claim or liability that is attached to property 
or some other right and that may lessen its value, such as a lien or mortgage”.  
 
Artikel 9 
1 Natuurlijke vruchten zijn zaken die volgens verkeersopvatting als vruchten van andere 
zaken worden aangemerkt. 
1. Natural fruits are things which, 
according to common opinion, are 
considered to be fruits of other things. 
1. Natural fruits are things which are 
commonly considered as fruits of other 
things. 
 Buma 39 
 
Natural fruits: Natural fruits is a Civil Law term which Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines as “[a] product of the land or of animals”. This coincides with the definition of 
natuurlijke vruchten. The term is also used in the Louisiana Civil Code, although the 
Quebec Civil Code merely uses the term fruits. As it is very much a literal translation of 
the source text term, it does not result in any deformations. 
 
2 Burgerlijke vruchten zijn rechten die volgens verkeersopvatting als vruchten van 
goederen worden aangemerkt. 
Civil fruits: Fockema Andreae defines burgerlijke vruchten as “rechten die als 
opbrengsten van rechten worden aangemerkt, zoals dividenden”. Civil fruit is defined in 
Black’s Law Dictionary as “[r]evenue derived from a thing by operation of law or by 
reason of a juridical act, such as lease or interest payments, or certain corporate 
distributions”. The Louisiana Civil Code also contains the term civil fruits, while the 
Civil Code of Quebec merely uses fruits. Much like the translation of natuurlijke 
vruchten above, this is a literal translation of the source text term, and as such does not 
result in any deformations. 
Civil law fruits: One might ask themselves why Warendorf et al. chose to translate with 
civil law fruits here instead of civil fruits. The term civil law fruits does not appear in 
Black’s Law Dictionary. Furthermore, a Google search reveals that civil fruits is used 
significantly more frequently than civil law fruits. Only three other sources found online 
contain the term civil law fruits – a book on the legal framework of Slovakia, a book on 
2. Civil fruits are rights which, according 
to common opinion, are considered to be 
fruits of property 
2. Civil law fruits[2][3] are rights which 
are commonly considered as benefits[5][8] 
from property. 
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Roman Private Law, and a book on Soviet Civil Law – and even in those cases, it 
appears only once or twice. Moreover, judging from the context of these sources, both 
terms seem to have the same meaning. Given that the translation by Warendorf et al. 
drew from the Haanappel translation, this decision to translate with a much more 
uncommon term is quite curious. In Berman’s terms, it is an attempt at clarification, 
resulting in expansion, which arguably adds nothing meaningful to the translation. 
benefits: Black’s Law Dictionary points out that fruits – including the terms natural 
fruits and civil fruits – are Civil Law terms. Here the translators have chosen to avoid 
Civil Law terminology, translating instead with benefits, which Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines as “[p]rofit or gain […]”. This choice for a much more generalizing term is quite 
curious, as in previous instances the translators did decide to translate the term vruchten 
with fruits, leading to the destruction of underlying networks of signification – although 
this might be because the term benefits is part of the definition of the term civil law 
fruits, which serves as a label, and the translators may then have wanted to make the 
definition itself more easily understandable. Nevertheless, the term benefits lacks the 
Civil Law connotations and specificity of use that are present in the term fruits, and as 
such could be seen as qualitative impoverishment. 
 
3 De afzonderlijke termijnen van een lijfrente gelden als vruchten van het recht op de 
lijfrente. 
arrears: Arrear is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “[a]n unpaid or overdue debt”. 
3. The individual arrears[4] of life-rents 
are deemed to be fruits of the right to the 
life-rent. 
3. Each annuity instalment is deemed to 
be a fruit of the right to annuity. 
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This implication of unpaid or overdue debts does not appear in the definition of 
termijnen in Fockema Andreae, which merely states “tijdslimiet; […] uiterste limiet, 
waarbinnen een rechtshandeling of feitelijke handeling moet plaatsvinden”. It is unclear 
why the translators have chosen to translate with a term which has a slightly different 
meaning here, although one it might simply be a matter of style – As Merriam-Webster  
(2016) notes, arrears finds it origins in the Anglo-French arrere, and the translators may 
have wanted to reflect the influence of French language Quebec law in their translation. 
As such, it could be seen as a type of stylistic ennoblement, or it could merely be 
interference from the French version of the translation. 
life-rents: Fockema Andreae defines lijfrente as “periodieke uitkering verschuldigd 
gedurende het leven van een of meer bepaalde personen, of gedurende zekere tijd mits 
de betrokken persoon in leven is. Black’s Law Dictionary contains a definition of life-
rent (or liferent) that applies to Scots law: “[t]he right to use and enjoy during a lifetime 
the property of another (the fiar) without consuming its substance”. This definition 
obviously differs from the definition of lijfrente in Fockema Andreae – it is more 
reminiscent of the term usufruct (Du. vruchtgebruik). Additionally, the term life-rent 
does not seem to appear in either the Louisiana Civil Code or the Civil Code of Quebec 
– curiously enough, however, both of these codes do use the term annuity (defined 
below). A more specific form of annuity which explicitizes the condition of the 
annuitant being alive can be found in Black’s Law Dictionary – namely life annuity. I 
was unable to find any sources which use the term life-rent in a way similar to the Dutch 
lijfrente. While Berman would likely approve of such a literal translation, it simply does 
not help readers understand the source text term in any way. 
annuity: Black’s Law Dictionary defines annuity as “[a] fixed sum of money payable 
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periodically; specif., a particular amount of money that is paid each year to someone, 
usu. until death”. An acceptable functional equivalent which is easily understandable to 
Common Law readers. 
 
4 Een natuurlijke vrucht wordt een zelfstandige zaak door haar afscheiding, een 
burgerlijke vrucht een zelfstandig recht door haar opeisbaar worden. 
A natural fruit which is separated from a thing/A  natural fruit separated from a 
thing: This paragraph forms a type of opposition, which describes how natural fruits 
and civil fruits become independent. Chroma (2014, 138) notes that in these cases a 
basic translational rule is that “language should be similar and divert only where the 
distinction is at issue”. In both translations, rationalization occurs, as the order of the 
sentence is changed. As a result, the parallelism (the linguistic pattern) between the two 
clauses is lost, despite such a translation being perfectly possible, as we see in the 
second clause of the Haanappel translation, which is more or less a literal translation 
that reflects the structure of the source text. Although this translation will most likely 
not affect the legal interpretation of either translation, it is yet another instance where 
the translators seemed to have sacrificed form in favor of meaning (although there is 
arguably no gain in meaning either). 
when it becomes exigible: This is a case of rationalization of the source text sentence 
structure into a more idiomatic target language expression. Additionally, as we have 
4. A natural fruit which is separated 
from a thing[1][9] becomes an 
independent thing; a civil fruit becomes an 
independent right by becoming exigible. 
4. A natural fruit separated from a 
thing[1][9] becomes an independent thing; 
a civil law fruit becomes an independent 
right when it becomes exigible[1][9]. 
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seen in the above annotation, the linguistic pattern present in the source text – the 
parallelism between the two clauses – is lost. While Berman would perhaps argue that it 
is an unnecessary deformation of the source text structure, the relevance of this 
deformation is debatable, as the legal interpretation of the translation is most likely not 
affected.  
 
Artikel 10 
Registergoederen zijn goederen voor welker overdracht of vestiging inschrijving in 
daartoe bestemde openbare registers noodzakelijk is. 
the public registers, provided for that purpose/the appropriate public registers: 
The problem here lies in whether one should use a restrictive relative clause or a non-
restrictive relative clause. It seems to be a case of rationalization, as Haanappel added a 
comma in his translation which is not present in the source text, perhaps in an attempt to 
make the translation more readable – however, in doing so, the meaning of the source 
text is changed. As the translation stands right now, the implication could be that there 
are public registers, provided for the purpose of recording the transfer or creation of 
registered property, and only those public registers. Given the structure of the source 
text, I think a restrictive relative clause would have been more appropriate here. 
Curiously enough, in Article 89 (1), the Haanappel translation does use a restrictive 
relative clause. The Warendorf et al. translation avoids the issue entirely, using an 
Registered property is property the transfer 
or creation of which requires entry in the 
public registers, provided for that 
purpose[1]. 
Registered property is property the transfer 
or creation of which requires entry into the 
appropriate public registers[1]. 
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adjective instead of a relative clause, although this also results in rationalization of the 
sentence structure. 
Artikel 11 
Goede trouw van een persoon, vereist voor enig rechtsgevolg, ontbreekt niet alleen, 
indien hij de feiten of het recht, waarop zijn goede trouw betrekking moet hebben, 
kende, maar ook indien hij ze in de gegeven omstandigheden behoorde te kennen. 
Onmogelijkheid van onderzoek belet niet dat degene die goede reden tot twijfel had, 
aangemerkt wordt als iemand die de feiten of het recht behoorde te kennen. 
good faith: Whereas good faith as a general principle is widely accepted in many Civil 
Law jurisdictions, it has been  met with resistance in English Common Law, which 
generally frowns upon establishing such general principles, although it is of course not 
opposed to the idea of good faith in contracts itself (Forte 1999, 7). This again 
highlights a problem for the Warendorf translation, which aims to avoid Civil Law 
Where good faith of a person is required 
to produce a juridical effect, such person is 
not acting in good faith if he knew the 
facts or the law to which his good faith 
must relate or if, in the given 
circumstances, he should know them. 
Impossibility to inquire does not prevent 
the person, who had good reasons to be 
in doubt,[1] from being considered as 
someone who should know the facts or the 
law. 
Where the good faith of a person is 
required to give legal effect[8] to 
something, such person does not act in 
good faith if he knew, or ought, in the 
circumstances, to have known, of the facts 
or the law to which his good faith must 
relate. The impossibility to make enquiries 
does not prevent a person with good reason 
to be in doubt from being deemed[8] to 
know the facts or the law. 
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terminology and to produce a translation which is accessible to Common Law readers – 
sometimes it is simply impossible to avoid the use of Civil Law terminology. As it is a 
literal translation, however, it does not lead to any deformations. 
legal effect: This is a case of the destruction of underlying networks of signification.  
Warendorf et al. use the term legal effect  as a translation for rechtsgevolg here, while 
juridical effect is used in Article 33. While both terms seem have the same general 
meaning – Black’s Law Dictionary lists legal as an alternative for juridical – legal is 
perhaps more widely used, especially in Common Law jurisdictions – the British 
National Corpus lists 50 results for legal effect, and only 1 result for juridical effect. It 
should also be noted that both the Louisiana Civil Code and the Civil Code of Quebec 
use both the adjectives legal and juridical – although neither contain the phrase legal 
effect or juridical effect –  this could mean that there is at least some difference in 
nuance or collocation. Nevertheless, the choice by Warendorf et al. to translate as legal 
effect in one instance, and juridical effect in another, is somewhat confusing. 
the person, who had good reasons to be in doubt,: Here, the same issue as in Article 
10 arises – the addition of a comma, perhaps in an attempt to produce a more readable 
translation, which changes a restrictive relative clause into a non-restrictive relative 
clause. The relative clause now merely functions as extra information rather than 
essential information and, as a result, the meaning of the translation when compared to 
the source text is changed. A restrictive relative clause – i.e. without the comma – would 
have been more appropriate here. This particular example perfectly demonstrates that 
disregarding the importance of punctuation can have fairly meaningful consequences. 
deemed: Another case of the destruction of underlying networks of signification; the 
term aangemerkt is translated in all previous cases as considered in both translations, 
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but here Warendorf et al. suddenly switch to deemed. A curious, if minor, detail, 
although Berman would perhaps argue that the current translation disregards the 
underlying networks of the source text and leads to an unnecessary deformation. 
 
Artikel 12 
Bij de vaststelling van wat redelijkheid en billijkheid eisen, moet rekening worden 
gehouden met algemeen erkende rechtsbeginselen, met de in Nederland levende 
rechtsovertuigingen en met de maatschappelijke en persoonlijke belangen, die bij het 
gegeven geval zijn betrokken. 
equity: The translation of billijkheid with equity is a rather risky one. While Black’s 
Law Dictionary does have a definition for equity as “[f]airness, impartiality”, equity 
also refers to “[t]he system of law or body of principles originating in the English Court 
of Chancery and superseding the common and statute law […] when the two conflict”. 
Barker (2014, 12) describes equity as a supplement on the Common Law, filling in the 
gaps and making the English legal system more complete. Equity does appear in both 
the Louisiana Civil Code and the Civil Code of Quebec, however, so that may have 
prompted this translation. However, given the strong connotations with the equity 
system in many Common Law jurisdictions, perhaps a more neutral translation would 
In determining what reasonableness and 
equity require, reference must be made to 
generally accepted principles of law, to 
current judicial views in the Netherlands, 
and to the particular societal and private 
interests involved. 
In determining what reasonableness and 
fairness require, generally accepted 
principles of law, current judicial views in 
the Netherlands and the societal and 
private interests involved in the case must 
be taken into account. 
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have been more suitable. 
 This example shows that Berman’s system of deforming tendencies is perhaps 
not entirely complete. Whereas qualitative impoverishment denotes translations which 
lack the “iconic richness” of the source text, this translation seems to do the opposite, 
replacing an arguably shallow source text language with a target language term which is 
far more “iconic”. 
fairness: Warendorf et al. have chosen for a more neutral translation. Barker (2014, 12) 
also notes: “[i]n a general sense equity means fairness”. Fairness, however, does not 
have any connotations with the system of equity, which makes it a much safer 
translation. 
 
Artikel 13 
1 Degene aan wie een bevoegdheid toekomt, kan haar niet inroepen, voor zover hij haar 
misbruikt. 
it is abused/its exercise constitutes an abuse: Here the subject in both translations is 
changed when compared to the source text, resulting in rationalization, as the translators 
may have thought it would make for a more idiomatic translation. Moreover, in the 
translation by Warendorf et al. we see that clarification occurs, as the translators 
explicitize what is not present in the source text, which in turn leads to expansion. Like 
many other deformations of the source text sentence structure, it is perhaps a somewhat 
unnecessary change, although unlikely to affect the legal interpretation of the translation 
1. The holder of a right may not exercise it 
to the extent that it is abused[1]. 
1. The holder of a right may not exercise it 
to the extent that its exercise constitutes 
an abuse[1][2][3]. 
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when compared to the source text. 
 
2 Een bevoegdheid kan onder meer worden misbruikt door haar uit te oefenen met geen 
ander doel dan een ander te schaden of met een ander doel dan waarvoor zij is verleend 
of in geval men, in aanmerking nemende de onevenredigheid tussen het belang bij de 
uitoefening en het belang dat daardoor wordt geschaad, naar redelijkheid niet tot die 
uitoefening had kunnen komen. 
intention/purpose: Another case of the destruction of underlying networks of 
signification; in the Haanappel translation, doel is initially translated as intention, where 
in a later instance it is translated as purpose. Moreover, intention is used consistently as 
a translation for wil in Articles 33-35. There is a subtle difference between intention and 
purpose. According to Black’s Law Dictionary intention is the “willingness to bring 
about something planned”, while purpose is “[a]n objective, goal, or end”, although 
whether this will lead to a different interpretation of the translation is questionable. The 
Warendorf et al. translation consistently uses the term purpose. 
2. Instances of abuse of right are the 
exercise of a right with the sole 
intention[8] of harming another or for a 
purpose other than that for which it was 
granted; or the exercise of a right where its 
holder could not reasonably have decided 
to exercise it, given the disproportion 
between the interest to exercise the right 
and the harm caused thereby. 
2. Amongst other things, a right is abused 
where it is exercised for the sole purpose 
of harming another or for a purpose other 
than that for which it was granted or where 
its exercise was unreasonable, given the 
disproportion between the interests in its 
exercise and the harm caused thereby. 
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[...] 
 
Titel 2. Rechtshandelingen 
Juridical acts: According to Fockema Andreae, a rechtshandeling is “[een] instrument 
tot het gestalte geven aan rechtsbetrekkingen: handeling waarvan op grond  van de 
context waarbinnen zij wordt verricht mag worden verondersteld dat de ‘handelende’ 
daarmee bepaalde rechtsgevolgen beoogd”. Common Law jurisdictions often have no 
term for the overarching concept of juridical acts, so translators are almost forced to 
turn to Civil Law terminology. Black’s Law Dictionary defines juridical act as “[a] 
lawful volitional act intended to have legal consequences”. It should be noted that the 
term rechtshandeling in Dutch law is relatively new – it did not appear, for instance in 
the 1838 Civil Code. The German Civil Code, which entered into force in 1900, does 
include a similar term in Rechtsgeschäft – which is also often translated as juridical act 
(Sefton-Green 2012, 38). 
 
Artikel 32 
1 Iedere natuurlijke persoon is bekwaam tot het verrichten van rechtshandelingen, voor 
zover de wet niet anders bepaalt. 
has the capacity: Here an adjective phrase is changed into a verb phrase – an example 
Title 2 Juridical acts Title 2 Juridical acts 
1. Every natural person has the 
capacity[1][3] to perform juridical acts to 
the extent that the law does not provide 
otherwise. 
1. Every natural person has the 
capacity[1][3] to perform juridical acts to 
the extent that the law does not provide 
otherwise. 
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of rationalization resulting in minor expansion, as it requires the addition of a definite 
article. While it is a minor deformation with little to no consequences regarding the 
legal interpretation of the source text, a translation containing the same structure as the 
source text would have been viable: “Every natural person is capable of performing…”. 
 
2 Een rechtshandeling van een onbekwame is vernietigbaar. Een eenzijdige 
rechtshandeling van een onbekwame, die niet tot een of meer bepaalde personen gericht 
was, is echter nietig. 
may be annulled: Here again the source text contains a parallelism that both 
translations seem to ignore, leading to the destruction of linguistic patterns. A notable 
feature of the term vernietigbaar, according to Fockema Andreae, is that “in 
tegenstelling tot nietigheid blijven de rechtshandelingen van kracht totdat zij met succes 
worden aangevochten (vernietigd)”. A similar term in English would be voidable, which 
means “[v]alid until annulled”. Additionally, Black’s Law Dictionary notes (under void) 
that “[t]he distinction between void and voidable is often of great practical importance. 
Whenever technical accuracy is required, void can be properly applied only to those 
provisions that are of no effect whatsoever”. It can be argued that this distinction is 
definitely of importance here. While one might rightly argue that this is also implied in 
2. A juridical act of an incapable person 
may be annulled[1][9]. A unilateral 
juridical act of an incapable person, 
however, is null where it is not addressed 
to one or more specifically determined 
persons. 
2. A juridical act of an incapable person 
may be annulled[1][9]. A unilateral 
juridical act of an incapable person, 
however, shall be null and void[3][4] 
where it is not addressed to one or more 
specific persons. 
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the phrase may be annulled, the use of both voidable and void/null would also have 
allowed the translators to avoid this particular deformation and maintain the parallel 
structure present in the source text – i.e. “A juridical act (…) is voidable. A unilateral 
juridical act (…) is void/null”. 
null and void: According to Fockema Andreae, nietigheid occurs in the case of a 
“rechtshandeling die de beoogde gevolgen ontbeert”. Black’s Law Dictionary states that 
null means “[h]aving no legal effect; without binding force”. Similarly, void means “[o]f 
no legal effect”. However, Black’s Law Dictionary (under null) states that “[t]he phrase 
null and void is a common redundancy”. De Groot (1996, 45), addressing the translation 
of legal doublets which are common in legal English, states that the best approach to 
translating legal doublets is to formulate them more concisely, in order to prevent that 
the reader gets the impression that they are dealing with a historical document. Here, 
however, the translators seem to have taken the exact opposite direction, inserting a 
legal doublet where none existed in the first place. It is a deformation – in this case an 
expansion of the mass of the source text which adds nothing to its meaning, and seems 
to be merely a stylistic choice. While this choice will most likely not have any 
consequences as to the legal interpretation of the translation, translating as either null or 
void would probably have been sufficient and perfectly understandable for any 
Common Law readers. 
 
[…] 
 
Artikel 34 
1 Heeft iemand wiens geestvermogens blijvend of tijdelijk zijn gestoord, iets verklaard, 
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dan wordt een met de verklaring overeenstemmende wil geacht te ontbreken, indien de 
stoornis een redelijke waardering der bij de handeling betrokken belangen belette, of 
indien de verklaring onder invloed van die stoornis is gedaan. Een verklaring wordt 
vermoed onder invloed van de stoornis te zijn gedaan, indien de rechtshandeling voor de 
geestelijk gestoorde nadelig was, tenzij het nadeel op het tijdstip van de rechtshandeling 
redelijkerwijze niet was te voorzien. 
impaired/impairment/disturbed/disturbance: While not necessarily an issue of legal 
translation, this is a strange case of a destruction of underlying networks of 
signification, notably within the same article. Whereas the Dutch text consistently uses 
1. Where a person whose mental faculties 
are permanently or temporarily impaired 
makes a declaration, the intention 
corresponding to that declaration is 
deemed to be lacking if the impairment 
prevented a reasonable appraisal of the 
interests involved or if the declaration was 
made under influence of that 
disturbance[8]. Unless prejudice was not 
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the 
juridical act, a declaration is presumed to 
have been made under the influence of the 
disturbance[8],[1] if the juridical act was 
prejudicial to the mentally disturbed[8] 
person. 
1. Where a person whose mental faculties 
are permanently or temporarily impaired 
makes a declaration, the intention 
corresponding to that declaration is 
deemed to be absent if the impairment 
prevented a reasonable appraisal of the 
interests involved or if the declaration was 
made under the influence of that 
disturbance[8]. Unless the prejudice was 
not reasonably foreseeable at the time of 
the juridical act, a declaration is presumed 
to have been made under the influence of 
the disturbance[8] if the juridical act was 
prejudicial to the mentally disturbed[8] 
person. 
 Buma 53 
 
the term stoornis, both the translation by Haanappel and the translation by Warendorf et 
al. first use the terms impaired/impairment, and halfway through the article switch to 
using disturbed or disturbance.  
,: Here again, we run into an issue of rationalization with regards to punctuation in the 
Haanappel translation – perhaps because of interference from the source text, or in an 
attempt to improve the readability of the translation. However, because the subordinate 
clause follows the main clause in this sentence, a comma is simply not necessary.  
2 Een zodanig ontbreken van wil maakt een rechtshandeling vernietigbaar. Een 
eenzijdige rechtshandeling die niet tot een of meer bepaalde personen gericht was, 
wordt door het ontbreken van wil echter nietig. 
where it is not addressed to one or more specific persons: Here, the sentence 
structure in both translations is changed. As Berman  notes, rationalization often occurs 
when the structure of the source text does not adhere to target language conventions. In 
this case, the emboldened clause is moved towards the end of the sentence, where it was 
in initial position in the source text. This is because new information is often placed at 
the end of a sentence in English, while Dutch allows for more freedom in this regard 
(Hannay et al. 1996, 145). As such, it could be argued that this deformation is a 
necessary one. 
 
2. A juridical act without such intention 
may be annulled. However, the absence of 
intention renders a unilateral juridical act 
null where it is not addressed to one or 
more specifically determined persons[1]. 
2. A juridical act without such intention 
may be annulled. However, the absence of 
intention renders a unilateral juridical act 
null and void where it is not addressed to 
one or more specific persons[1]. 
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Artikel 35 
Tegen hem die eens anders verklaring of gedraging, overeenkomstig de zin die hij 
daaraan onder de gegeven omstandigheden redelijkerwijze mocht toekennen, heeft 
opgevat als een door die ander tot hem gerichte verklaring van een bepaalde strekking, 
kan geen beroep worden gedaan op het ontbreken van een met deze verklaring 
overeenstemmende wil. 
The absence of intention in a declaration…: The source text here is an extremely 
long complex sentence, and it is no wonder that the translators have changed the 
structure in order to create a more fluent translation. Leaving the main clause at the end, 
as in the source text, would have created frontal overload and double orientation, which 
is acceptable in Dutch, but not in English. In that regard, while this may be a 
deformation of the sentence structure, it is arguably necessary from a viewpoint of 
effective writing. 
 
[...] 
 
The absence of intention in a 
declaration[1] cannot be invoked against a 
person who has interpreted another’s 
declaration or conduct, in conformity with 
the sense which he could reasonably 
attribute to it in the circumstances, as a 
declaration of a particular tenor made to 
him by that other person. 
The absence of intention in a 
declaration[1] cannot be invoked against a 
person who interpreted another’s 
declaration or conduct in conformity with 
the sense which he could reasonably 
attribute to it in the circumstances as a 
declaration of a particular implication 
made to him by that other person. 
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Artikel 84 
1 Voor overdracht van een goed wordt vereist een levering krachtens geldige titel, 
verricht door hem die bevoegd is over het goed te beschikken. 
valid title: While this translation does not result in any of Berman’s deforming 
tendencies, there are some legal issues which are relevant here. Fockema Andreae 
defines titel as: “juridische basis, […] oorzaak voor overdracht van een goed”. Loonstra 
(2009, 181) further explains that the titel in the case of a purchase often means the 
purchase agreement (Du. koopovereenkomst), although in other cases it can also be a 
schenking or ruilovereenkomst. Title, on the other hand, is defined in Black’s Law 
Dictionary as “[t]he union of all elements (as ownership, possession, and custody) 
constituting the legal right to control and dispose of the property; the legal link between 
a person who owns property and the property itself”. Obviously there seems to be a 
discrepancy between these two definitions. The translation title most likely comes from 
the French titre – and indeed, the French translation uses titre –  as the translator may 
have wanted to avoid the Common Law consideration which, according to Black’s Law 
Dictionary, is “that which motivates a person to do something, esp. to engage in a legal 
act. Consideration […] is necessary for an agreement to be enforceable”. While this 
decision may be understandable in the case of the Haanappel translation, which aimed at 
the use of Civil Law terminology – title, along with related expressions such as by 
gratuitous title, are used in the Louisiana Civil Code and the Civil Code of Quebec – the 
use of title in the translation by Warendorf et al. is somewhat confusing, especially 
1. Transfer of property requires delivery 
pursuant to a valid title by the person who 
has the right to dispose of the property. 
1. Transfer of property requires delivery 
pursuant to a valid title by the person who 
has the right to dispose of the property. 
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given the presence of a Common Law equivalent in consideration, and the vastly 
different definition of the term title in Common Law jurisdictions. Alternatively, Foster 
(2009) suggests cause or causa, which Black’s Law Dictionary describes as: “the 
concept of cause as legal consideration is used to determine which transactions are 
binding and which ones are not: ‘Cause is the reason why a party obligates himself’”. 
This term seems to come closer to the definition of titel and avoids Common Law 
connotations. 
 
2 Bij de titel moet het goed met voldoende bepaaldheid omschreven zijn. 
The title must describe the property in a sufficiently precise manner: This is a case 
of rationalization, as the passive structure of the source text is changed into active. The 
change from active to passive is arguably a necessary one in this case, as literally 
translating “[b]ij de titel” in a passive construction in English would most likely have 
led to a grammatically unusual translation or would have required explicitation. 
 
[...] 
 
Artikel 86 
1 Ondanks onbevoegdheid van de vervreemder is een overdracht overeenkomstig artikel 
90, 91 of 93 van een roerende zaak, niet-registergoed, of een recht aan toonder of order 
geldig, indien de overdracht anders dan om niet geschiedt en de verkrijger te goeder 
trouw is. 
2. The title must describe the property 
in a sufficiently precise manner.[1] 
2. The title must describe the property 
in a sufficiently precise manner.[1] 
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moveable object: Here, again, we have a case of the destruction of underlying networks 
of signification. While Warendorf et al. previously translated zaak as thing, here, 
roerende zaak is translated as moveable object. Additionally, object was previously used 
as translation for the Dutch object – although, admittedly, there is some overlap between 
the terms as per the definition of things in Article 2. While this translation may not 
cause any major problems, it does come across as unnecessary and perhaps even 
somewhat careless. Moreover, in Article 90 and Article 236, roerende zaak is translated 
as moveable thing, which makes this translation choice here rather confusing. 
by gratuitous title: For the issue regarding the translation of titel as title, see the 
annotation under Article 84. Gratuitous simply means ‘for no consideration’ – 
coincidentally, for no consideration is also the suggestion given by Foster (2009). 
Furthermore, unlike by gratuitous title, it will not cause confusion among Common Law 
readers. 
 
[…] 
 
3 Niettemin kan de eigenaar van een roerende zaak, die het bezit daarvan door diefstal 
1. Although an alienator lacks the right to 
dispose of the property, the transfer 
pursuant to articles 90, 91 or 93 of a 
moveable thing, unregistered property, or a 
right payable to bearer or order is valid, if 
the transfer is not by gratuitous title and 
if the acquirer is in good faith. 
1. Although an alienator lacks the right to 
dispose of the property, the transfer 
pursuant to Article 90, 91 or 93 of a 
moveable object[8], unregistered property, 
or a right to bearer or order is valid, if the 
transfer is not by gratuitous title and the 
acquirer acts in good faith. 
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heeft verloren, deze gedurende drie jaren, te rekenen van de dag van de diefstal af, als 
zijn eigendom opeisen, tenzij: 
revendicate: According to Black’s Law Dictionary, revendication, in Civil Law, means 
“[a]n action to recover real rights in and possession of property that is wrongfully held 
by another”.  A lexical and semantical equivalent, revindicatie, appears in Fockema 
Andreae, although it is not used in the Dutch Civil Code itself. Revendicate is used in a 
similar context in the Civil Code of Quebec. As this concerns only the translation of a 
single term, it is difficult to make any statements on deforming tendencies. 
recover: Warendorf et al. have chosen for a more neutral translation that is neither 
specific to Common Law nor Civil Law. Coincidentally, in the definition of 
revendication, Black’s Law Dictionary does provide a suggestion for a Common Law 
equivalent, namely replevin: “[a]n action for the repossession of personal property 
wrongfully taken or detained by the defendant”. However, replevin might not be as 
easily understandable to those not familiar with Common Law. Recover is a more 
accessible term, and is also used in a similar context in Article 524 of the Louisiana 
Civil Code. 
 
[…] 
 
 
3. Nevertheless, the owner of a moveable 
thing, who has lost its possession through 
theft, may revendicate it during a period 
of three years from the day of theft, unless 
3. Nevertheless, the owner of a moveable 
object, who has lost its possession through 
theft, may recover it during a period of 
three years from the day of theft, unless: 
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Artikel 89 
1 De voor overdracht van onroerende zaken vereiste levering geschiedt door een daartoe 
bestemde, tussen partijen opgemaakte notariële akte, gevolgd door de inschrijving 
daarvan in de daartoe bestemde openbare registers. Zowel de verkrijger als de 
vervreemder kan de akte doen inschrijven. 
notarial deed/notarial instrument: According to Fockema Andreae, a notariële akte is 
“[een] door een notaris verleden openbare akte”. The cognates notariële – referring to 
notaris – and notarial might cause some problems, as notary also brings to mind the 
English notary public, which is different from the Dutch notaris in both function and 
training. The accepted translation for notaris is generally civil-law notary (e.g., Foster 
2009), however, given that the nature of the text makes it clear that we are dealing with 
Dutch law, and for the sake of brevity, the decision of the translators to not employ an 
explicitizing translation is understandable. According to Fockema Andreae, akten are 
“ondertekende geschriften, bestemd om tot bewijs te dienen”. Akten are divided into 
authentieke akten and niet-athentieke akten. Authentieke akten, then are “in de vereiste 
vorm en bevoegdelijk opgemaakt door ambtenaren, aan wie bij of krachtens de wet is 
1. Delivery required for the transfer of 
immoveable things is made by notarial 
deed intended for that purpose and drawn 
up between the parties, followed by its 
entry in the public registers provided for 
that purpose. Either the acquirer or the 
alienator may have the deed registered. 
1. Delivery required for the transfer of 
immoveable things is made by notarial 
instrument intended for that purpose and 
drawn up between the parties, followed by 
its entry into the appropriate public 
registers. Either the acquirer or the 
alienator may have the instrument 
registered. 
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opgedragen op die wijze te doen blijken van de door hen gedane waarnemingen of 
verrichtingen. Als authentieke akte worden tevens beschouwd de akten, waarvan het 
opmaken aan ambtenaren is voorbehouden, doch waarvan de wet het opmaken in 
bepaalde gevallen aan anderen dan ambtenaren opdraagt” (Article 157(1) of the Dutch 
Code of Civil Procedure). The definition of deed, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, 
is “any written instrument that is signed, sealed, and delivered and that conveys some 
interest in property”, although Barker (2014, 113) notes that, at least in England, the 
requirement for sealing was abolished in 1989. Zwalve (2008, 483-484) notes that 
Common Law does not have authentieke akten – the deed must simply be signed by its 
maker, or in the maker’s presence by two witnesses. Foster instead suggests instrument, 
which Black’s Law Dictionary defines as “[a] written legal document that defines 
rights, duties, entitlements, or liabilities”. This is a somewhat more general term which 
does not carry the connotations with Common Law that are present in deed . 
 
2 De tot levering bestemde akte moet nauwkeurig de titel van overdracht vermelden; 
bijkomstige bedingen die niet de overdracht betreffen, kunnen in de akte worden 
weggelaten. 
accessory stipulations/ancillary provisions: According to the website of the kadaster, 
a beding is “een voorwaarde in een overeenkomst”. Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
2. The deed intended for delivery must 
clearly specify the title of transfer; 
accessory stipulations which do not 
concern the transfer may be omitted in the 
deed. 
2. The instrument intended for delivery 
must clearly specify the title of transfer; 
ancillary provisions which do not relate to 
the transfer may be omitted from the 
instrument. 
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stipulation as “[a] material condition or requirement in an agreement”. Accessory means 
“[s]omething of secondary or subordinate importance”. 
 Black’s Law Dictionary defines provision as “[a] clause in a statue, contract, or 
other legal instrument. […] A stipulation made beforehand”. Ancillary means 
“[s]upplementary; subordinate”. 
Going by the definitions, these terms seem to have roughly the same meaning, so 
it is unclear exactly where the difference lies. What is clear that an online search for 
ancillary provisions yields significantly more hits than accessory stipulations – 
additionally, the British National Corpus yields 4 results for ancillary provisions, 
whereas accessory stipulations yields no results at all – which may make the former a 
more accessible or domesticating translation, whereas the latter may have a slightly 
foreignizing effect. 
 
3 Treedt bij een akte van levering iemand als gevolmachtigde van een der partijen op, 
dan moet in de akte de volmacht nauwkeurig worden vermeld. 
procurator/procuration: According to Fockema Andreae, a volmacht is “de 
bevoegdheid die een volmachtgever verleent aan een ander, de gevolmachtigde, om in 
zijn naam rechtshandelingen te verrichten”. Black’s Law Dictionary defines procurator 
as “[a]n agent or attorney-in-fact”, and procuration as “[t]he act of appointing someone 
as an agent or attorney-in-fact, so this translation seems like a perfectly acceptable 
3. Where in a deed of delivery a person 
acts a procurator of one of the parties, the 
procuration must be clearly specified in 
the deed. 
3. Where in an instrument of delivery a 
person acts as attorney of one of the 
parties, the power of attorney must be 
clearly specified in the instrument. 
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functional equivalent. 
attorney/power of attorney: Black’s Law Dictionary defines attorney and power of 
attorney as “[o]ne who is designated to transact business for another; a legal agent”. 
And “[the ability] to act as agent or attorney-in-fact”, respectively. While attorney is 
also used in the sense of “[s]omeone who practices law”, when used in this sense it is 
often referred to as attorney-at-law, so the translation should not cause any major 
issues, although perhaps attorney-in-fact would have prevented any confusion from 
occurring in the first place. 
 
4 Het in dit artikel bepaalde vindt overeenkomstige toepassing op de levering, vereist 
voor de overdracht van andere registergoederen. 
mutatis mutandis: The Kenniscentrum Wetgeving en Juridische Zaken indicates that 
van overeenkomstige toepassing is used “indien de bepaling waarnaar wordt verwezen, 
niet geheel letterlijk kan worden toegepast, maar misverstand over de toe te passen tekst 
uitgesloten is”. Mutatis mutandis is a Latin term meaning “[a]ll necessary changes 
having been made; with the necessary changes”. It is somewhat curious that Warendorf 
et al. use a Latin term here, despite their claim of aiming to avoid the use of Latin terms 
in the translation. Perhaps they thought the term was widely used enough that it would 
not pose a problem. The use of Latin here could, however, be seen as an exoticization, 
or ennoblement, as the source text makes no use of Latin. 
4. The provisions of this article apply 
mutatis mutandis[4] to the delivery 
required for the transfer of other registered 
property. 
4. The provisions of this article apply, 
mutatis mutandis[4], to the delivery 
required for the transfer of other registered 
property. 
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[...] 
 
Titel 9. Rechten van pand en hypotheek 
Afdeling 1. Algemene bepalingen 
hypothec: Hypotheek is defined in Fockema Andreae as “beperkt zekerheidsrecht op 
registergoederen, teneinde een vordering bij voorrang op het onderzette goed te 
verhalen; de schuldeiser is de hypotheeknemer, de schuldenaar de hypotheekgever”. 
Hypothec, a Civil Law term, is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “[a] mortgage 
given to a creditor on property to secure a debt”. Purely going by this definition, the 
distinction between hypothec and mortgage (defined below) does not become 
immediately apparent. However, the distinction becomes clear when looking at the 
definition of hypothecation: “[t]he pledging of something as security without delivery of 
title or possession”. As this is a foreignizing and literal translation of the source text 
term, it does not lead to any deformations. 
mortgage: Black’s Law Dictionary defines mortgage as “[a] conveyance of title to 
property that is given as security for the payment of a debt or the performance of a duty 
and that will become void upon payment or performance of the stipulated terms”. The 
essential difference between hypotheek and mortgage is that a mortgage transfers title to 
the mortgagee, while a hypotheek does not – ownership stays with the hypotheekgever. 
If one wishes to avoid the use of the Civil Law hypothec, equitable mortgage might be a 
possible translation. Barker (2014, 280) notes that, in the case of an equitable mortgage, 
“the mortgagee receives merely an equitable interest in land”. An argument in favor of 
Title 9 Rights of pledge and hypothec 
Section 1 General provisions 
Title 9 Rights of pledge and mortgage 
Section 1 General provisions 
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translating as mortgage would be that the term itself is defined in Article 227, thus 
mortgage could serve as what Rayar (1997, xvii) calls a label. 
 
Artikel 227 
1 Het recht van pand en het recht van hypotheek zijn beperkte rechten, strekkende om 
op de daaraan onderworpen goederen een vordering tot voldoening van een geldsom bij 
voorrang boven andere schuldeisers te verhalen. Is het recht op een registergoed 
gevestigd, dan is het een recht van hypotheek; is het recht op een ander goed gevestigd, 
dan is het een recht van pand. 
established over/upon: Here Warendorf et al. have chosen to use a different preposition 
after two different instances of established, even though the term is used in the same 
context in both instances. This results in the destruction of underlying networks of 
signification. While it is not a major deformation in this instance, it is still a rather odd 
inconsistency that is difficult to explain, as it is difficult to find any sources that might 
1. The right of pledge and the right of 
hypothec are dismembered rights intended 
to provide recourse against the property 
subjected thereto for a claim for the 
payment of a sum of money, with 
preference over other creditors. Where 
such right has been established upon 
registered property, it is a hypothec; where 
it has been established upon other property, 
it is a pledge. 
1. The right of pledge and the right of 
mortgage are limited rights intended to 
provide recourse against the property 
subject thereto for a claim for payment of a 
sum of money, with preference over other 
creditors. Where such a right has been 
established over[8] registered property, it 
is a mortgage; where it has been 
established upon[8] other property, it is a 
pledge. 
 Buma 65 
 
explain if there is any difference in meaning or use between these two collocations – 
although the British National Corpus yields 34 results for established over and only 3 
results for established upon. 
 
[...] 
 
Artikel 236 
1 Pandrecht op een roerende zaak, op een recht aan toonder of order, of op het 
vruchtgebruik van een zodanige zaak of recht, wordt gevestigd door de zaak of het 
toonder- of orderpapier te brengen in de macht van de pandhouder of van een derde 
omtrent wie partijen zijn overeengekomen. De vestiging van een pandrecht op een recht 
aan order of op het vruchtgebruik daarvan vereist tevens endossement. 
usufruct: Fockema Andreae defines vruchtgebruik as “beperkt recht om binnen het 
1. The right of pledge on a moveable thing, 
on a right payable to bearer or order, or on 
the usufruct of such a thing or right, is 
established by bringing the thing or the 
document to bearer or order under the 
control of the pledgee or of a third person 
agreed upon by the parties. Furthermore, 
endorsement is required for the 
establishment of a right of pledge on a 
right payable to order or on the usufruct 
thereof. 
1. The right of pledge on a moveable thing, 
on a right payable to bearer or order, or on 
the usufruct of such a thing or right, is 
established by bringing the thing or the 
paper to bearer or order under the control 
of the pledgee or of a third person agreed 
upon by the parties. Furthermore, 
endorsement is required for the 
establishment of a right of pledge on a 
right payable to order or on the usufruct 
thereof. 
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kader van het beperkte recht eens anders goed te gebruiken en daarvan de vruchten te 
genieten”. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, usufruct is a Roman and Civil Law 
term meaning “[a] right for a certain period to use and enjoy the fruits of another’s 
property without damaging or diminishing it”. While this translation does not result in 
any deformations, it is important to note that, because Common Law has no full 
equivalents to usufruct, Warendorf et al. were forced to also use a Civil Law term here, 
which perhaps reveals a weakness in their translation strategy. 
endorsement: Also called indorsement. According to Black’s Law Dictionary it is 
“[t]he placing of a signature, sometimes with additional annotation, on the back of a 
negotiable instrument to transfer or guarantee the instrument or to acknowledge 
payment”. This coincides with the definition of endossement in Fockema Andreae: “het 
overdragen (endosseren) van een wissel of cheque aan order, door de houder […] aan 
een geëndosseerde. Het endossement geschiedt door een verklaring op de achterzijde of 
op een allonge van de wissel.” 
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Conclusion 
 
Of course the excerpts discussed in the comparison form only a minuscule part of the 
Dutch Civil Code and the translations. A more extensive comparison would have allowed 
for quantification of the results and provided more perspective on whether certain 
discrepancies were structural or incidental. This was simply outside the scope of this 
thesis, however.  
 With regards to Berman’s deforming tendencies, it is fair to say that both 
translations contain a fair amount of rationalization, which in turn often leads to 
clarification, expansion, and the destruction of linguistic patterns. However, whether or 
not this is relevant with regards to the translation of legal texts is another matter entirely. 
While it could be argued that, just as the translation of legal terminology should remind 
readers that they are dealing with a different legal system, this should also be reflected in 
aspects such as sentence structure, in practice other factors often come into play as well. 
The nature of legal texts and their translation often rules out the possibility of annotations 
or translator’s notes within the text itself. Furthermore, the aim of a translation and its 
target audience will always influence the strategy that a translator can employ and to what 
extent a text should be made more accessible. As noted earlier, translations do not always 
have the same aim as their source text counterparts. Whereas a legislative source text is 
primarily prescriptive, its translation might be more informative. 
 One specific deforming tendency which I think deserves additional attention is the 
destruction of underlying patterns of signification – or, in other words, the consistency 
with regards to the translation of terminology. The way in which specific terminology is 
translated, or not translated, is perhaps even more important in legal translation than it is 
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in literary translation. Ideally, if a single term in the source text is translated differently 
in different instances in the target text, one should be allowed to assume that the translator 
had good reason to do so. However, especially in the translation by Warendorf et al. it 
becomes apparent that consistency is sometimes lacking, even in instances where it seems 
unnecessary – for instance, the translation of roerende zaak as both moveable thing and 
moveable object. One factor which I feel might have contributed to this is the translation 
strategy employed by Warendorf et al. When attempting to produce a translation of a 
Civil Law legislative source text while at the same time aiming to avoid Civil Law 
terminology and to produce a text which is accessible to Common Law readers, one 
inevitably runs into problems, leading to Civil Law and Common Law terms being used 
interchangeably. This issue becomes most apparent in the use of the term title, which is 
used in its Civil Law sense in paragraph 1 of Article 84, while it is used in its Common 
Law sense paragraph 3 of the same Article.  I suspect that this is further influenced by the 
fact that the Warendorf et al. translation drew from the Haanappel translation. 
 On the other hand, there were a few instances in the Haanappel translation that 
showed that the use of legal terms in their Civil Law sense might be risky, as these terms 
have significantly different denotations in a Common Law context. The most prominent 
example was the translation of billijkheid as equity, but also the use of the term title as a 
translation for titel. 
 Additionally, it is clear from the outset that the translators’ focus was mainly on 
issues regarding the translation of legal terminology, judging by the translators’ prefaces. 
This is a reflection of what one finds in the literature on legal translation – issues regarding 
the translation of legal terminology seem to attract the bulk of the attention. While this 
may be for good reason, it seems that questions of sentence structure and style are all but 
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ignored, at least judging by the translators’ prefaces. This is reflected in deformations and 
inconsistencies in both translations with regards to sentence structure which become 
apparent by applying Berman’s deforming tendencies to the translations, and additionally 
by multiple instances of unnecessary or incorrect use of punctuation. Moreover, many 
parallelisms which were present in the source text, often used to signify and emphasize 
essential differences, were lost in both translations. While it could be argued that many 
of these deformations do not affect the legal interpretation of the translation when 
compared to the source text, different legal languages often contain differences regarding 
style and the way in which texts are structured, and the fact that both translations ignore 
the issue entirely in their respective preface is telling (for a translation which does discuss 
these aspects, see, for instance, the preface to the English translation of the Dutch Penal 
Code by Rayar and Wadsworth (1997)). 
 Finally, Berman’s list of deforming tendencies sometimes seem to fall short, or 
seems to be incomplete. Certain phenomena which could be seen as deformations, such 
as compression and generalization, cannot neatly be classified under any of the existing 
deforming tendencies. On the other hand, other deforming tendencies (such as the 
destruction of rhythm, the destruction of vernacular networks or their exoticization, the 
destruction of expressions and idioms, and the destruction of the superimposition of 
languages) did not appear in either translation and as such may simply not be relevant 
for the purpose of legal translation. Additionally, while Berman’s system of deforming 
tendencies can at times point out where issues in the translation of specific legal 
terminology occur, it simply falls short at explaining them – for this, comparative law is 
required. This all points back to the issue raised in the beginning, namely that general 
translation studies often fail to address legal translation. While I agree with Harvey 
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(2002, 182-183) in that I do not think that this is because legal translation is inherently 
more challenging or complicated than other types of translation, there are a number of 
features which set it apart from the translation of literature or other types of special-
purpose translation. The nature of legal language and terminology, the differences 
between legal systems, combined with the differing purposes of translations even within 
the field of legal translation all make it so that, as is often the case, general theories 
simply are not sufficient for special-purpose translation. 
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